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Abstract 
 
 In this paper, the impact of alternative development strategies on growth and 
poverty is assessed in an economywide framework, using Egypt as a case study. The 
analysis is guided by the following question: By pursuing a development strategy 
different from the one actually pursued since the late 1970s, could Egypt’s government 
significantly have improved the status of its poor? To address this question, a dynamic, 
recursive, Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model is used to simulate Egypt’s 
economy for the period 1979-1997. The model is built around a Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) for 1979. The base scenario incorporates Egypt’s evolving policy regime 
and changes in Egypt’s external environment, including a gradual transition toward an 
economy with less government involvement. The other scenarios differ in terms of trade 
policies, domestic incentives, asset distribution, and the pattern of domestic productivity 
growth.  
The results indicate that pro-poor redistribution of land and human capital assets 
could have been a particularly effective tool had Egypt prioritized more strongly to 
improve the welfare of the poor and reduce inequalities. Such policies could have been 
implemented without any noticeable negative impact on growth or aggregate welfare. 
The results also suggest that, for Egypt, there was no contradiction between more rapid 
growth, largely a function of more rapid productivity growth, and improved welfare for 
the poor. The impact of more rapid reduction of price distortions, induced by taxes and 
subsidies, is small but positive in terms of aggregate growth. The effects of introducing 
biases in favor of specific sectors may be stronger and depend on the specific context, 
including the nature of economic linkages and, with regard to the policies analyzed in this 
paper, on the ease with which it is possible to raise productivity growth, reduce 
transactions costs, and get improved access to export markets. The present analysis 
confirms the finding of earlier analyses that, compared to pro-manufacturing policies, 
pro-agricultural policies have a more positive impact on household welfare in general and 
the poor in particular. There is a significant synergy between a pro-agricultural shift in 
productivity growth, improved market access for agricultural exports, and reduced 
transactions costs in foreign trade.    
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          In this chapter, the impact of alternative development strategies on growth 
and poverty is assessed in an economywide framework, using Egypt as a case study. The 
analysis is guided by the following question: By pursuing a development strategy 
different from the one actually pursued since the late 1970s, could Egypt’s government 
significantly have improved the status of its poor? To address this question, a dynamic, 
recursive, Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model is used to simulate Egypt’s 
economy for the period 1979-1997. The model is built around a Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) for 1979. The base scenario incorporates Egypt’s evolving policy regime 
and changes in Egypt’s external environment, including a gradual transition toward an 
economy with less government involvement. The other scenarios differ in terms of trade 
policies, domestic incentives, asset distribution, and the pattern of domestic productivity 
growth.  
We will proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the evolution of the Egyptian 
economy during the period 1979-1997. In Section 3, the model and its database are 
presented. Section 4 defines the simulations and presents their results. Section 5 discusses 
the broader implications of the results and extracts conclusions. 
 
2. EGYPT’S ECONOMY 1979-1997 
 
Since the start of its economic “open-door” policy in 1974, Egypt has undergone a 
gradual transition toward a more open economy with less government involvement and 
stronger reliance on the private sector. 
  Tables 2.1 and 2.2 summarize the evolution of Egypt’s economy between 1979 
and 1997. As indicated by Table 2.1, GDP at market prices and factor cost grew at 
average rates of around 5% per year. After having benefited from an oil-driven boom 
after 1974, Egypt faced a deteriorating external environment during most of the 1980s. 
Relative changes in the international prices of Egypt’s exports and imports were 
unfavorable – in current dollars, export and import prices increased by 12% and 96%, 
                                                 
1The author would like to thank Moataz El-Said and Rebecca Harris for professional research assistance 
and, together with other colleagues in IFPRI’s Trade and Macroeconomics Division, for helpful comments.  
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respectively. The major factor behind this terms-of-trade loss was a strong decline in the 
real world prices of Egypt’s main export, oil. At the same time, the growth rate slowed 
down for other major sources of foreign exchange, most importantly remittances from 
workers abroad. These developments were major factors behind a balance-of-payments 
crisis in the late 1980s, followed by a program of stabilization and structural adjustment 
in the early 1990s. The severity of the crisis was mitigated by extensive debt forgiveness 
from Western lenders in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War.
2 
In the context of Egypt’s adjustment to tighter external constraints, import growth 
was relatively slow while exports continued to expand at pace with the rest of the 
economy. As a result, domestic absorption grew less rapidly than GDP at market prices. 
Among the components of absorption, investment and government consumption suffered 
relative to household consumption. On the sectoral level, GDP at factor cost grew most 
rapidly for services, followed by industry with agriculture lagging in relative terms.
3 
  The decline in the GDP share of government consumption is indicative of 
a general shift toward less government involvement in the economy. Table 2.2 shows that 
the GDP shares declined for trade taxes (primarily import tariffs), consumer subsidies 
(non-targeted but providing substantial benefits to the poor) and total current government 
revenue  while the shares of direct taxes and domestic indirect taxes remained roughly 
unchanged. The fall in the share of the government budget in the overall economy 
coincided with a gradual reduction in centralized government controls over prices, 
production, and investment. For the agricultural sector, this has involved a gradual 
elimination of implicit taxation administered by means of price controls on outputs 
(taxing the farmers) and inputs (subsidizing the farmers). In 1979, the net effect of these 
policies was a tax burden that corresponded to 20% of sectoral value-added  (Dethier, 
1989b, pp. 263-265; Dethier, 1989b, p. 267; Löfgren, 1997, pp. 283-286). At the time, the 
implicit subsidy on domestic purchases of oil represented a larger GDP share than food 
subsidies or implicit agricultural taxes. In the 1970s, Egypt’s government did not increase  
                                                 
2In current dollars, Egypt’s foreign debt grew from 14bn in 1979 to $46bn in 1988. By 1997, it had 
declined to $30bn, primarily as a result of forgiveness (World Development Indicators, 1999). 
3Table A.1 includes more disaggregated data on the sectoral structure of trade, production, and final 
demand in 1979 and 1997.  
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Table 2.1: Macro data for Egypt 1979-1997. 
  Nominal GDP shares (%)  
 
Annual real growth 
1979-97  (%)
1  1979  1997 
                   
GDP at market prices  5.1  100.0  100.0 
Private Consumption  4.6  64.4  74.9 
Fixed investment  0.9  31.6  17.7 
Government consumption  2.8  17.9  10.2 
Resource Balance    -13.9  -2.8 
Net Indirect Tax    5.4  6.6 
       
GDP at factor cost  5.1  100.0  100.0 
     Agriculture  2.8  22.1  17.7 
     Industry  5.2  35.6  31.8 
     Services  5.9  42.3  50.5 
       
TFP  1.8     
Exports  5.3  29.3  21.4 
Imports  0.5  43.3  24.2 
Export price index (current dollars 1979=100)    100.0  112.4 
Import price index (current dollars 1979=100)    100.0  195.6 
Population
2 
2.3  39.9  60.3 
Per-capita consumption
3 
2.2  100.0  148.2 
       
Gini Coefficient       
      Rural    27.5  32.1 
      Urban    32.2  38.5 
Poverty
4 
     
      Rural    16.1  23.3 
      Urban    18.2  22.5 
       
 
Sources: World Bank, 1999; Handy, 1998, p. 8; Adams, 1999, pp. 13, 17, 34, 38; SAMs for 1979 and 1997 (see 
Löfgren, 2000) 
Notes: 
1 Unless otherwise noted this column shows annual real percentage growth for 1979-1997. 
2 The first column shows annual growth. The columns 1979 and 1997 show total population in millions.  
3 The first column shows annual growth. The columns 1979 and 1997 show real consumption (1979=100).  
4 The data are for 1981/82 and 1995/96, respectively. The indicator used is the headcount index with the  
    poor defined as the share of the population that is below both food and non-food poverty lines. 
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Table 2.2. Selected government items and implicit taxes and subsidies, 1979 
and 1997 (% of GDP). 
 





           
Government revenues 
    Trade taxes   7.9   3.2 
    Indirect taxes   4.5   5.0 
    Direct taxes   6.2   5.7 
    Total*   32.1  18.1 
 
Government expenditures 
    Consumption  17.9  10.2 
    Consumer subsidies   7.0   1.6 
     
Government Savings  0.4   2.9 
     
Implicit agricultural tax   4.9   0.0 
Implicit oil subsidy  24.6   0.0 
  Source: SAMs for 1979 and 1997 (see Löfgren, 2000) 
*Total includes other revenue items. 
 
domestic prices of petroleum products as international prices soared. As a result, 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the domestic price was on average only around 20% of 
the export price (World Bank, 1980, p. 77; Choucri and Lahiri, 1983, p. 2). Since then, 
the government subsidy has gradually been eliminated as domestic prices have been 
raised and the export price has fallen.  
           In summary, during this period Egypt underwent a process of macro 
stabilization and structural adjustment in response to a deteriorating external 
environment. At the same time, Egypt managed to raise government savings and move 
from deficit to surplus in the current account of the Balance of Payments, while overall 
growth was maintained at a moderate level.  
          A major issue is how the poor have managed during such a process of 
stabilization and structural adjustment. Available statistics indicate that, compared to 
other developing countries, Egypt is relatively egalitarian (Hansen, 1991, pp. 25-26) but 
has a low level of human development relative to its per-capita income.
4 The data in 
                                                 
4Data for 1995 indicate that Egypt ranked 92 according to its real GDP per capita (PPP$) but only 112 on 
the basis of its Human Development Index value (UNDP, 1998).   
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Table 2.1 indicates that, although average per-capita household consumption grew by 
around 2% per year, both poverty and inequality have increased.
5  
          Changes in the economic conditions of the poor may be seen as determined 
by the rate and pattern of economic growth, including the influence of explicit anti-
poverty interventions. In the Egyptian context, many analysts have concluded that 
government interventions in the price system, including both price controls and tax and 
subsidy policies, have distorted incentives, leading to growth-reducing inefficiencies 
(Hansen, 1991, p. 167). In addition to explicit taxes, complex export and import 
procedures give rise to transactions costs that represent a significant part of the value of 
the traded goods.
6 As noted by Hansen (1991, p. 15), these transaction costs, which are 
likely to have risen in the second half of the 1970s (during the first years of Egypt’s 
economic opening), may represent socially unnecessary waste. As a form of non-tariff 
barriers, they also make sales in domestic markets more profitable, thereby reducing 
economic openness and stifling the impact of government efforts to promote exports 
(World Bank, 1997, pp. 62-69). 
          At a given growth rate, the pattern of growth is likely to matter in terms of 
what happens to the poor. A pro-agricultural strategy has frequently been advocated 
because of linkage effects and distributional considerations. Such a strategy may raise the 
incomes of the poor, not only of those working in the agricultural sector, but also of 
others who, in relatively labor-intensive activities, supply final consumption goods to the 
poor and intermediate inputs to agricultural production  (see for example Adelman, 1984, 
p. 938; Delgado et al. 1998, pp. 5-25). As noted above, since the early 1980s, Egypt has 
gradually removed what initially was a severe bias against the agricultural sector.  
Explicit anti-poverty interventions may improve the welfare of the poor by raising 
the quantity or productivity of their assets, by boosting the sale price of the services of 
these assets, and by subsidizing the prices of commodities in the “basic needs” basket 
                                                 
5 The poverty and inequality data in Table 2.1 are based on nationally representative household surveys by 
CAPMAS (Egypt’s national statistics agency) in 1981/82 and 1995/96, and by IFPRI in 1997. Both the 
inequality and the poverty figures are uncertain, for inequality both in terms of levels and direction of 
change, and for poverty primarily in terms of levels. Informed assessments, based on comparisons between 
different studies, suggest that both rural and urban poverty rates have increased since the beginning of 
1980s (Assaad and Rouchdy, 1999, pp. 12-14; Adams, 1999, pp. 10-14 and 16-19).  
6The rates vary widely depending on the commodity and the trading partner. According to the World Bank 
(1997, p. 66), the estimated rates range from 5-90% of the product value.   
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(Adelman and Robinson, 1989, pp. 983-984). In Egypt, consumer subsidies have 
protected the living standards of the poor, at least from a short-run perspective. As a 
share of total household consumption, these subsidies declined from 11% in 1979 to 2% 
in 1997. In terms of per-capita benefits, they have been higher (by some 30-50%) in 
urban areas but quite equally distributed across the different households in each area 
(Alderman and von Braun, 1984, pp. 41-42; Ahmed et al., 1998, pp. 95-96). 
          Among asset-related poverty interventions, the role of the government in 
influencing the land and human capital assets of the poor is particularly important.
7 After 
the 1952 revolution, the land reform and expansion of education and health care enabled 
the poor to earn higher incomes, thereby reducing inequality and poverty.
8 In recent 
years, some of these developments have been reversed as land tenancy laws, which, at the 
time of the land reform in the 1950s, gave tenants with formal contracts near ownership 
rights, have been modified to the advantage of the owners. At the same time, the quality 
of public education has deteriorated while its cost has increased (Assaad and Rouchdy, 
1999, pp. 24-27, 34-36; the Economist 1999, pp. 10-12). Other things being equal, these 
developments reduce the shares of the poor in the skilled labor force, and in labor and 
land incomes.
9 
         In this chapter, a CGE model of Egypt is used to simulate the impact on 
economic performance, including household welfare, from changes in the different areas 
referred to in the preceding discussion (tax- and subsidy policies; transactions costs in 
foreign trade; asset distribution; and productivity growth). The analysis pays special 
attention to potential trade-offs between growth and equity. While the analysis is applied 
to Egypt during a specific period of its history, the aim is to contribute to a broader 
                                                 
7On the basis of a review of several studies, Assaad and Rouchdy (1999, p. 18) conclude that the level of 
education of the head of household seems to be the best predictor of  poverty. The 1996 Human 
Development Report for Egypt notes that the uneven land distribution contributes greatly to poverty in rural 
Egypt (Assaad and Rouchdy, p. 34, citing INP, 1996, p. 40).  
8 Between 1958/59 and 1974/75, the Gini coefficient at the national level declined from 0.43 to 0.38. 
(Hansen, 1991, p. 226). For data documenting improvements in human capital between 1960 and 1986, see 
Hansen (1991, pp. 229-234). Egypt’s Human Development Report for 1997/98 documents increases in the 
country’s Human Development Indicator for the period 1960-1995 (UNDP, 1998b, pp. 14-16). 
9 Appendix Tables A.2 and A.3  summarize the parts of a 1979 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of Egypt 
that links factor payments to disaggregated households groups (rural and urban poor, middle-income and 
rich households).   
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understanding of the impact of alternative policies, in particular in terms of the welfare of 
the poor. The next section presents the model that is used in the analysis.  
 
3. A CGE MODEL OF EGYPT: STRUCTURE AND DATABASE 
 
   The dynamic CGE model of this chapter is structured and disaggregated so as to be 
able to capture major features of Egypt’s policy regime and alternative policies aimed at 
improving the welfare of the poor. The model is distinguished by its inclusion of 
consumer subsidies, implicit taxes on agriculture and subsidies on oil, transactions cost in 
foreign trade, perfect transformability in foreign trade for selected commodities, and a 
flexible treatment of closures for the macro balances. In other respects, it is kept as 
simple as possible. It functions as a simulation laboratory, permitting the conduct of 
controlled experiments that address counterfactual, “what-if” questions regarding the 
impact of alternative policy packages on Egypt’s economy during the period 1979-
1997.
10 
  The model is calibrated to a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of Egypt for 1979 and 
draws on a database that summarizes the evolution of Egypt’s economy for the period 
1979-1997. One advantage of simulating a CGE model for a historical period is that the 
validity of the model can be assessed via a comparison between observed and simulated 
data.
11 
   The model consists of two parts, a static within-period submodel and a dynamic, 
between-period submodel. The static submodel solves for general equilibrium in one time 
period while the dynamic submodel updates model parameters, either according to 
exogenous trends (for population, labor force, and changes in the policy regime) or on the 
basis of earlier model solutions (for capital stocks).   
                                                 
10 The seminal studies introducing the use of CGE models to analyze alternative development strategies for 
developing countries are Adelman and Robinson (1978) on South Korea, and Dervis and Robinson (1978) 
on Turkey. For the analysis of Turkey, see also Dervis et al. (1982). Earlier Egypt studies in this vein 
include Dethier (1985), Ahmed et al. (1985), and Löfgren et al. (1998). For a review of CGE models of 
Egypt, see Löfgren (1994). 
11The relatively few observations that are available over time make it difficult or impossible to pursue the 
alternative approach of using an econometrically estimated model while maintaining a satisfactory 
treatment of policy tools and policy-relevant disaggregation of sectors and households.  
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This section starts with a description of the static submodel. After this, we turn to 
the dynamic submodel and the database.  
 
3.1. THE STATIC SUBMODEL 
 
Factors, Activities and Domestic Institutions 
 
Table 3.1 shows the disaggregation of factors, activities, and institutions.  
 
Table 3.1. Disaggregation of institutions, factors and activities. 
Set  Elements 
Factors (4)  Unskilled labor, Skilled labor, Capital, Land 
Activities (9) 
Agriculture, Oil, Food processing, Textiles, Other industry, Construction, 
Transportation, Government labor services, Other services  
Households (6) 
Rural poor, Rural middle, Rural rich 
Urban poor, Urban middle, Urban rich 
Other institutions (2)  Government, Rest of world 
 
The model includes nine activities, each of which produces a distinct commodity. 
Most activities use capital and both labor types.
12 The only exceptions are agriculture, 
which uses land, capital and unskilled labor, and government labor services, which only 
uses skilled and unskilled labor. 
The production technologies are summarized in Figure 3.1. Producers are 
assumed to maximize profits subject to a multi-level technology. At the top level, output 
is a Leontief aggregation of aggregate value-added and an intermediate input aggregate. 
Aggregate value added is produced by factors in a CES (constant-elasticity-of-
substitution) function. The intermediate input aggregate is a Leontief aggregation of 
disaggregated commodities. Like other commodities used domestically, each 
disaggregated intermediate input is a composite commodity that is made up of imports 
and domestic output sold domestically. (See the discussion below on the treatment of the 
rest of the world.) 
                                                 
12 Dethier (1985, pp. 134-139, 181) has seven labor categories that here have been aggregated to two , 
skilled and unskilled.  
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For the oil sector, production is driven by decisions regarding the use of oil 
reserves, a factor that is not explicit in the model. In order to treat oil production as 
largely exogenous in a simple manner, capital use in the oil activity is fixed while the 
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Domestic factor incomes are split among the domestic institutions (households and 
government) in fixed shares. In addition to factor incomes, government revenue consists 
of transfers from the rest of the world (fixed in foreign currency), import tariffs, and taxes 
– direct taxes, activity taxes, sales taxes, and export taxes. On the spending side, 
government consumption and transfers to households are fixed shares of nominal GDP. 
Transfers to the rest of the world from the government (as well as any other domestic 
institution sending money abroad) are fixed in foreign currency. The government 
subsidizes household food consumption. All taxes and subsidies are ad valorem. In 
addition to these taxes and subsidies (which appear explicitly in the government budget), 
the implicit taxation to which Egypt’s agriculture has been subjected during most of the 
period studied is modeled as a tax on agricultural value-added that is passed on to 
domestic demanders of the agricultural commodity in the form of a lower price. 
In both rural and urban areas, the bottom two quintiles are classified as “poor.”
13 
The middle-income households are represented by the third and fourth quintiles and the 
rich by the top quintile. Each household type is characterized by a specific pattern of 
factor ownership and other income sources. In addition to the income flows referred to 
above – factor incomes and government transfers – households receive transfers 
(primarily remittances from temporary migrant workers abroad) from the rest of the 
world (fixed in foreign currency). Household incomes are used to pay taxes, save 
(according to an exogenous saving propensity), and consume. Consumption demand is 
determined by the linear expenditure system (LES), expressed in per-capita form. 
 
The Rest of the World and Commodity Markets 
 
  In addition to paying and receiving transfer payments (all of which are fixed in 
foreign currency), the rest of the world supplies imports and demands exports.  
                                                 
13The shares of the rural and urban populations defined as poor are higher than in Table 2.1. However, 
poverty rates vary widely between different studies, in part depending on differences in definitions or the 
data. On the basis of the 1995/96 CAPMAS household survey, El-Laithy (1997, pp. 2-3, 7) arrived at 
urban, rural and national (upper level) poverty rates of 43.4%,  46.9%, and 45.2%, respectively. The urban 
and rural per-capita expenditure levels that defined the dividing line between poor and non-poor were 
derived from estimates of the costs of food baskets meeting minimum nutritional needs in each area and 
statistically estimated relationships between food and non-food expenditures.  
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To the extent that a commodity is imported, all domestic users – households, the 
government, investors, and producers using intermediate inputs – demand a composite 
commodity that is an aggregation of imports and domestic output sold domestically. (If it 
is not imported, domestic demanders simply buy the domestic commodity.) The mix 
between demands for imports and domestic output is sensitive to relative prices in a 
setting with imperfect substitutability captured by a CES-aggregation function. Similarly, 
if a commodity is exported, domestic output is transformed into supplies of exports and 
domestic sales in proportions that are sensitive to relative prices in a setting with 
imperfect transformability captured by a constant-elasticity-of-transformation (CET) 
function. In addition, during the years preceding 1979, Egypt liberalized its import 
regime, among other things by permitting “own-exchange” imports for agents that had 
earned foreign exchange. As a result, imports surged very rapidly, most likely a reflection 
of pent-up demand (Hansen, 1991, p. 202). To capture this, the model assumes that, 
Egypt initially was above its import demand curve but were back on it by 1997 after a 
gradual shift. 
The imperfect substitutability and transformability assumptions grant the 
domestic price system a certain degree of independence from international prices and 
dampen export and import responses to changes in the producer environment. The model 
explicitly considers transactions costs in foreign trade. For every unit of a commodity that 
is imported or exported, a fixed quantity of service commodities is demanded.  
The processes of commodity aggregation (of commodities from different sources 
for domestic use) and transformation (of domestic outputs to supplies to different 
destinations) generate demands for and supplies of domestic outputs destined for 
domestic use. These markets are cleared by flexible domestic prices.  
These two processes also generate import demands and export supplies. Egypt is 
treated as a small country on the import side, buying any quantity it desires at prices that 
are exogenous in foreign currency. On the export side, Egypt faces downward-sloping but 
relatively elastic export demand curves. In addition to the foreign-currency price, the 
prices paid for imports by domestic demanders and received by domestic producers for 
their exports both depend on the exchange rate, and trade taxes and subsidies. In the  
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domestic market, consumer subsidies (primarily on food) lower the prices paid by 
households.  
A different treatment of exports is applied to the oil and agriculture commodities, 
for which quality differences between quality differences are relatively small between 
items that are traded internationally and sold and produced domestically. For oil, it is 
assumed that domestic output and exports are perfectly transformable. For both oil and 
agriculture, export demand is infinitely elastic at prevailing world prices.  
 
Macro and Micro Closures 
 
System constraints are those constraints that have to be satisfied by the economic 
system, but which are not considered in the decisions of any micro agent (Robinson 1989, 
p. 907-908). On the macro level, the constraints consist of three balances, associated with 
the accounts for the government, the rest of the world, and savings-investments. On the 
micro level, the constraints are represented by supply-demand balances in the product 
and factor markets. The “closure rules” of the model indicate the mechanisms on the 
basis of which the model satisfies these constraints. Table 3.2 summarizes the rules that 
are followed. To assure that the base run provides a numerically realistic reference point 
for the counterfactual simulations, its closure rules are different for the government and 
savings-investment balances.  
In the base simulation, government savings is a fixed share of GDP; the direct tax 
rates of the households are adjusted in a neutral manner to generate the target savings 
level.
14 The second government closure is applied in most experiments: government 
savings are treated as endogenous while direct tax rates are fixed.
15 
 
                                                 
14According to the adjustment rule, the change in the direct tax rates is uniform across the different 
household categories. For example, if the rates of households A and B initially are 5% and 10%, 
respectively, and there is a need  to increase the overall rate by two points, the adjusted tax rates of 
households A and B become 7% and 12%. The adjustment rule is the same for household savings rates. 
15 The formulation with flexible government savings provides insight about the changes in government 
savings, total savings and investment that would have taken place in the absence of a complementary 
change in government tax or spending policy.  
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Table 3.2. Equilibrating variables for micro and macro constraints. 
  Equilibrating variable 
  BASE simulation  Other simulations 
Macro Constraints     
      Savings-investment balance  Household savings rates 
(investment is fixed GDP share; 
investment-driven savings) 
Quantities of investment 
demand (savings-driven 
investment) 
      Government balance  Direct income tax rate 
(government savings is fixed GDP 
share)  
Government savings (fixed 
direct income tax rates) OR 
same as BASE 
      Current account of Balance 
       of Payments 
Exchange rate  same as BASE 
Micro Constraints     
      Markets for exports  Quantity demanded or (foreign-
currency) export price 
same as BASE 
      Markets for imports  Quantity supplied  same as BASE 
      Markets for domestic output sold  
      domestically 
Price  same as BASE 
      Markets for factors  Wage  same as BASE 
 
For the savings-investment balance, the base simulation fixes investment as a 
share of GDP at observed levels. The savings rates of households are adjusted to assure 
that savings and investment values are equal. For the non-base simulations, investment 
quantities are scaled to balance savings and investment values. Household savings rates 
are kept at the levels of the base simulation.  
Across all simulations, the third macro balance, the current account of the rest of 
the world (i.e. the current part of the Balance of Payments), clears via a flexible exchange 
rate. Foreign savings are fixed in foreign currency. This is a simplified treatment of 
Egypt’s complex foreign exchange regime (including as many as three parallel exchange 
rates during part of the 1980s). 
The micro level assumptions are also identical across all simulations, base and 
non-base. As mentioned above, for commodities, most export markets and the markets 
for domestic output that is sold domestically are cleared by flexible prices. The markets  
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for imports and selected exports are cleared by the quantities supplied and demanded, 
respectively (the small-country assumption).  
Given the long-run nature of the analysis, it is assumed that all factors are mobile 
across activities. For capital, the model solves endogenously for the intersectoral 
allocation that equates the rental rate across sectors and fully employs the aggregate 
capital stock. A similar treatment is also used in the skilled and unskilled labor markets: 
total employment is fixed at observed levels while flexible aggregate wages clear each 
market. However, contrary to capital rents, the wages of both labor types are 
differentiated by activity on the basis of fixed ratios (calculated from base-year data), 
reflecting the presence of inter-sectoral wage gaps. 
 
3.2. THE DYNAMIC SUBMODEL 
 
  The within-period, static model is solved in three-year intervals for seven years 
during the period 1979-1997. Between each static-model solution, selected parameters 
are updated in the dynamic (between-period) submodel. Among these, the aggregate 
capital stock is updated endogenously, given previous investment and depreciation, 
extrapolating for the inter-period years.  Exogenous updating is applied to the parameters 
for population, domestic labor force, temporary labor migrants abroad, factor 
productivity, export and import prices, export demand parameters, government policies, 
and transfers to and from the rest of the world. The policy parameters include tax, tariff 
and subsidy rates as well as government consumption and government transfers. To 
assure that real growth in the oil sector stays close to the historical record, capital use in 
this sector is also updated exogenously, at the rate of growth in real oil GDP at factor 
cost.   




The basic data source is a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for 1979 to which the 
bulk of the base year model parameters were calibrated. Initially, a SAM was constructed 
using the information in Dethier (1985, pp. 172-188). In order to make it possible to 
address issues raised in the above discussion, this SAM was adjusted and expanded in 
various areas. Additional data were needed for exogenous parameter updating between 
the solutions. 
More specifically, the treatment of the government in the 1979 SAM was 
changed, including the separation of food subsidies from other government items. 
Implicit taxation of agriculture and transactions cost in foreign trade was made explicit. 
The evolution of rates of taxes and subsidies were derived by interpolating the data in the 
1979 SAM and a SAM for 1997 with a similar disaggregation (see Löfgren and El-Said, 
1999). Data for population, domestic labor force, and temporary migrants were derived 
from World Bank sources and various specialized studies.   
For household consumption, the income elasticities of Dethier (1985, pp. 187) were 
retained. For each household group, the Frisch parameter was estimated using the 
formula in Lluch et al. (1977, p. 248). Trade and production elasticities were selected on 
the basis of the survey in Löfgren (1994b). (The elasticity values used in the model are 
displayed in Tables A.5-A.6.)
 16 
It should be stressed that Egypt’s database is incomplete in some areas and that 
data from different sources sometimes are contradictory. Hence, in various cases, the 
author had to informally evaluate available information and select plausible numbers.
17 
 
                                                 
16 The main sources that supplemented Dethier (1985) in the construction of the 1979 SAM were Alderman 
and von Braun (1984, pp. 41-42), Hansen  (1991, p. 219),  Dethier (1989, vol. II, p. 267), and World Bank 
(1997). In addition to the 1997 SAM used for Löfgren and El-Said (1999), the values for model parameter 
in future years were primarily derived from  Hansen and Radwan (1982), Richards and Waterbury (1996), 
Fergany (1991), Ahmed et al (1998), IMF’s International Financial Statistics (various years), World Bank 
(1997), World Bank (1999), and FAO (2000) .  
17 For goods trade (excluding oil exports), it was assumed that transactions costs in the base year 
represented 20% of the domestic price paid by domestic demanders or exporters (in effect reducing 
producer export revenue by this percentage). This estimate is at the lower end of a wide range (see World 
Bank, 1997.   
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4. SIMULATIONS  
 
  As mentioned above, the model is used to simulate the Egyptian economy for the 
period 1979-1997. In these simulations, the static submodel is solved in three-year 
intervals for seven years (1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, and 1997). Between the 
static solutions for individual years, parameters are updated endogenously (on the basis 
of simulated data from earlier years) or exogenously (on the basis of real-world data) 
following the procedure that was outlined in Section 3.  
We will first present the results for the base scenario, comparing simulated data to 
real-world observations. After this we turn to the non-base simulations, which explore the 
effects of alternative scenarios for price liberalization, productivity growth, and asset 
redistribution.  
 
4.1. BASE SCENARIO AND MODEL VALIDATION 
 
  The model is initially solved for the base simulation that provides the benchmark 
to which the results for the other simulations are compared. In the dynamic submodel, all 
changes in parameter values were gradual: the values of most parameters move at a 
constant percentage rate between 1979 and 1997. The values for 1997 values coincide 
with observed real-world data.  
As noted in Section 3 (see Table 3.2), the closure assumptions for the base 
simulation are defined to assure that the model more closely tracks observed changes on 
the macro level. For the government, the rates for explicit taxes and subsidies are scaled 
so as to assure that each tax and revenue value matched the observed GDP share. 
Moreover, the efficiency parameters of the value-added functions (indicating total factor 
productivity) are multiplied by a scalar (uniform across all activities) that adjusted 
endogenously to generate the trend level of aggregated real GDP at factor cost. In the 
non-base simulations, efficiency parameters and tax and subsidy rates are all fixed at the 
levels generated by the base simulation unless changes are introduced as part of the 
experiments.   
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Table 4.1 compares the observed and simulated growth rates for the period 1979-
1997. In general, the simulated data are reasonably close to the observed data, with the 
gaps between the two staying within the range of measurement errors for observed data 
(judging from revisions of macro data and discrepancies between alternative series).
 18 
The endogenously generated rate of TFP growth is close to an independent estimate.  
Growth in GDP at factor cost is by construction identical to the observed rate. The only 












GDP at market prices  5.1  4.7 
Consumption  4.6  5.1 
Fixed investment  0.9  0.9 
Government consumption   2.8  2.3 
     
GDP at factor cost  5.1  5.1 
     Agriculture  2.8  3.2 
     Industry  5.2  4.3 
     Services  5.9  6.4 
TFP  1.8  1.9 
Exports  5.3  6.0 
Imports  0.5  3.2 
     Sources: See Table 2.1 for for actual data. 
 
                                                 
18 For example, for the period 1981/82-1986/87, the Ministry of Planning and World Bank estimates of 
annual real growth in public consumption are 7.0% and 3.2%, respectively. The divergences for other 
national account items are smaller but still substantial (Hansen, 1991, p. 5-6). 
19 Hansen (1991, p. 137-138) notes that measuring commodity imports “throws up disturbing data 
problems,” among other things reflected in large gaps between data from exchange and customs authorities. 
One potential source of problems is military imports.  
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The model simulation results include additional information about the evolution 
of the Egyptian economy between 1979 and 1997. (See the column for the base 
simulation in Table 4.3 below.) Given the purposes of this study, disaggregated changes 
in household welfare are of particular importance. While the rate of growth in aggregate 
real household per-capita consumption is 2.7%, it is only 0.6% for the poor.  Inequality 
(measured by the Theil index) increases during the period.
20 This information is 
compatible with the observed changes in poverty and inequality that were reported in 
Section 2. 
The above information indicates that the model, in spite of being relatively small, 
is able to track the evolution of Egypt’s economy to a reasonable extent. Given this and 
the fact that its track record of generating plausible responses to changes in exogenous 
conditions, it is considered as valid for the current purposes, i.e., to assess the impact of 
alternative counterfactual policies on growth, the poor and income distribution. 
 
4.2. NON-BASE SCENARIOS 
 
The non-base simulations are divided into three sets. The first analyzes the effects 
of alternative scenarios in the areas of price liberalization and transactions costs, and the 
second explores asset redistribution and changes in productivity growth. The third set 
investigates the impact of simultaneous changes in more than one area. When analyzing 
the different scenarios, we focus on changes in growth and household welfare. 
                                                 
20 For information about the Theil index, see Theil (1971, pp. 642 and 645) and Sadoulet and de Janvry 
(1995, p. 21). Note that the index here measures inequality between the different household groups without 
considering inequality within each group.   
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Price policy and transactions costs 
 
As noted in Section 2, relative to GDP, trade taxes, food subsidies, and implicit 
taxes and subsidies (for agricultural and oil products) declined substantially during the 
period 1979-1997 while other indirect domestic taxes remained roughly unchanged. This 
section analyzes the impact of more radical changes in tax and subsidy policies. Tables 
4.2 and 4.3 display simulation assumptions and results, the latter in terms of changes for 
the period as a whole. Subsequently, the path of change will also be discussed. 
 
 
Table 4.2. Assumptions for price policy simulations. 
  CONSSUB  OILSUB  TRCOST  INDTAX 
  Consumer subsidies eliminated  Yes      Yes 
Implicit oil subsidies eliminated    Yes    Yes 
Indirect taxes eliminated         Yes 
Cut in transactions costs in foreign trade (-50%)      Yes   
Flexible government savings and fixed direct tax rates  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Fixed government savings and flexible direct tax rates      Yes 
   
 
Under the base scenario, consumer subsidies accounted for 7.0% of GDP in 1979, 
5.6% in 1982 and, after a gradual decrease, 1.6% in 1997 (cf. Table 2.2). In the first 
simulation, CONSSUB, food subsidies are fully eliminated starting from 1982 (without 
any complementary tax or spending policy on the part of government). Compared to the 
base simulation, this results in higher government savings, in the final year amounting to 
1.8% of GDP but representing a higher figure in earlier years (when the subsidy cuts 
compared to the base scenario were higher).  Higher savings brings about an increase in   
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Table 4.3. Results for price policy simulations. 
  BASE  CONSSUB  OILSUB  TRCOST  INDTAX  
    divergence from BASE 
Real household consumption (% gpy)* 
    Average  2.7  0.1  0.4  0.5  0.1 
    Rural  2.9  0.1  0.4  0.5   
         Poor  0.8    0.5  0.5  -0.1 
         Middle  3.4  0.1  0.4  0.5  0.1 
         Rich  3.3  0.2  0.5  0.5  0.1 
    Urban  2.6  0.1  0.4  0.5  0.1 
         Poor  0.4    0.5  0.5  -0.1 
         Middle  2.2  0.1  0.3  0.4  0.1 
         Rich  3.7  0.2  0.4  0.5  0.2 
    Poor  0.6    0.5  0.5  -0.1 
    Non-poor  3.2  0.2  0.4  0.5  0.1 
Theil index, 1997 (1979=100)  133.9  -1.5  -3.0  -1.0  0.5 
Factor income share, 1997 (%)           
    Labor unskilled  10.5  0.2  0.4  0.2  -0.1 
    Labor skilled  21.3  -0.2  -0.5  -0.3  0.2 
    Capital  58.0  -0.4  -0.9  0.2   
    Land  10.2  0.4  0.9  -0.1  -0.2 
Agricultural labor share, 1997 (%)  39.6  0.5  1.1  -0.7  -0.3 
Real GDP at factor cost  (%gpy)           
    Agriculture  3.2  0.3  0.5  0.1   
    Oil  3.2         
    Construction  1.7  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.2 
    Manufacturing  6.0  0.5  0.8  0.7  0.2 
    Services  6.4  0.4  0.8  0.2  0.2 
  Total  5.1  0.4  0.7  0.3  0.2 
Trade (%gpy)           
    Agriculture exports  2.6  1.1  1.7  3.3  0.8 
    Manufacturing exports  7.6  0.8  1.3  1.8  0.7 
  Total exports  6.0  0.4  0.7  0.8  0.3 
    Agriculture imports  6.2  0.1  0.3  1.4  0.2 
    Manufacturing imports  3.0  0.2  0.4  0.5  0.2 
  Total imports  3.6  0.2  0.4  0.8  0.2 
Real exchange rate (%gpy)  1.6  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.3 
Capital stock (%gpy)  4.0  0.7  1.3  0.5  0.3 
Government savings, 1997 (%GDP)  2.9  1.8  0.7  0.6   
Direct taxes  (%GDP)  5.6  -0.1      7.2 
  Note: *%gpy = % growth per year. 
 
investment and more rapid growth in the capital stock (by 0.7% per year), and in GDP at 
factor cost (by 0.4% per year). The production increase is highest for the construction 
sector (driven by the investment increase). The changes in the distribution of factor 
incomes and household consumption are small. There are some gains in per-capita 
consumption for the non-poor and on the aggregate level while the poor are unaffected.  
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This reflects that the poor benefited more from food subsidies than the non-poor. 
According to the Theil measure, inequality declines marginally.
21 For this and other 
scenarios in which GDP growth increases, the exchange rate depreciates since accelerated 
export expansion, for most sectors, requires a price cut in the face of   downward-sloping 
demand curves.  
In the second simulation, OILSUB, where the implicit oil subsidy is eliminated, 
the effects are larger than for the food subsidy since this subsidy represents a larger share 
of GDP during most of the period. The gain in domestic sales revenue for the oil sector 
(which is government-owned) is paid directly to the government. During the years when 
the implicit oil subsidy was significant under the base scenario, there is under this 
scenario a significant gain in the values for government savings, total savings and 
investment. For the period as a whole, both government and household savings grow 
more rapidly than for the base scenario and, for household savings, also compared to the 
preceding scenario with the cut in food subsidies. Oil exports increase as higher domestic 
oil prices reduce domestic consumption. Compared to BASE and CONSSUB, the 
increases in the growth rates for GDP, the capital stock, and household consumption are 
also larger. The gains are quite evenly distributed across all household groups.  
As noted in Section 2, transactions costs associated with foreign trade may be a 
major impediment to the performance of Egypt’s economy. To the extent that they are 
unnecessary, they not only waste resources but also distort incentives against foreign 
trade more strongly then explicit export taxes and import tariffs. In the model, these 
transactions cost are captured by a demand for “other services” whenever a commodity is  
traded internationally. In the third experiment, TRCOST, the coefficients that define the 
quantities of other services demanded per unit of exports and imports are cut by 50%.
22 
 
                                                 
21The Theil inequality measure is based on the ratio between consumption and population shares for each 
household group. In the simulation CONSSUB, inequality declines in spite of that non-poor households 
gain more than the poor. This is driven by the fact that, according to data with two or more decimals, in the 
poor and middle household groups, the poorer rural households do slightly better  than their urban 
counterparts while the rich households are affected to an almost identical extent in both regions.  
22 At base-year prices, from 20% to 10% of the traded value for goods with explicit trade transactions costs 
(all flows of goods trade except oil exports).  
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This cut in transactions costs has strong economywide repercussions. Aggregate 
real GDP growth increases by 0.3%. On the household level, the impact is a relatively 
evenly shared consumption gain by 0.5% with no significant change in inequality. Both 
exports and imports increase as the prices received by domestic exports suppliers increase 
while the prices paid by domestic import demanders decline. Government tariff revenue 
increases.  
In the last simulation in this set, INDTAX, elimination of food and oil subsidies is 
accompanied by the elimination of all indirect taxes (explicit import tariffs, export taxes, 
and domestic activity taxes; and implicit taxes on agriculture). Such a policy shift would 
be implausible without complementary changes in government policy that assures a 
reasonable balance between revenue and spending. Here, the policy shift is accompanied 
by changes in direct tax rates that, in each year for which the model is solved, keep 
government savings at the base scenario share of GDP.  
The overall impact is very limited. Some increases are registered in the 
consumption of the non-poor, in capital stock growth, and in GDP outside agriculture and 
the oil sector. These changes show that positive but small efficiency gains result as price-
distorting taxes and subsidies are replaced by a less distorting direct tax. The policy shift 
does, however, require an increase in the GDP share of direct taxes, in 1997 from 5.6% 
for the base simulation to 12.8% for INDTAX.
23 
The preceding discussion refers to growth rates for the period as a whole or GDP 
shares for the final year. Figures 4.1-4.3 complement this information by showing the 
evolution of per-capita consumption for average, poor and non-poor households, 
respectively under the simulations in the first set.  
  These figures show that, compared to the base, the households are initially worse 
off under CONSSUB and OILSUB but not under TRCOST. For the average household, 
by the early 1990s, the gains from more rapid growth dominate the initial losses from the 
policy changes. For the poor, the initial losses are stronger, in particular for the scenario  
 
                                                 
23When the simulation INDTAX was implemented with fixed direct tax rates and flexible government 
savings, the rate of capital stock growth declined sharply (by 0.7%) as a result of lower savings and 
investment. The rate of GDP growth declined by 0.3%. Growth in household consumption was maintained 
at base levels at the expense of lower investment spending.  
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Figure 4.1: Price policy and transaction cost simulations: Average 
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Figure 4.3: Price policy and transaction cost simulations: Non-poor 
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where consumer subsidies are eliminated, and the overall impact of the policy changes 
are less positive.  
  In a set of additional simulations, the scenarios with elimination of oil and 
consumer subsidies were implemented assuming the alternative government closure with 
savings fixed at the levels of the base scenario while the direct tax rates were flexible.
24 
The results show that, when government savings are fixed while direct tax rates are 
flexible, the households are, on average, compensated for the initial negative effects at 
the expense of long-run growth (since the marginal propensity to save for the households 
is less than for the government, for which it is unity); the long-run efficiency gain from 
earlier and complete subsidy elimination are minimal. When, alternatively, government 
savings are flexible, household consumption increases more in the long run at the 
expense of a negative initial effect. The negative initial effect predominates until the 
savings have generated enough capital to significantly raise production and incomes. 
Irrespective of government closure rule, elimination of consumer subsidies leads to a 
significant welfare decline for most of the period for the poor households. On the other 
hand, for oil subsidies, the impact over time on poor households depends on the 
government closure rule.  
To conclude, the results for this set of simulations indicate that the impact of 
eliminating food and oil subsidies depends on how the government uses the surplus that 
results. If it is saved, growth accelerates (as a result of more rapid capital accumulation 
and increased savings) at the expense of consumption during an initial period. If it is used 
to reduce direct taxes, efficiency gains generate a very small increase in the growth of 
aggregate household consumption. The efficiency gains are also small when all indirect 
taxes and subsidies are replaced by direct taxes.
25 By contrast, the scenario with a 
reduction in trade transaction costs gives rise to broad-based gains throughout the period 
of analysis. The changes in inequality are minor. 
                                                 
24 Figures A.1-A.6 compare the household-level impact of eliminating oil and consumer subsidies under the 
two alternative government closure rules that were described in Table 3.2. 
25The relatively high degree of sectoral aggregation is likely to reduce the dispersion of indirect tax and 
subsidy rates. As a result, the efficiency gains from removing the distortionary impact of these taxes and 
subsidies may be underestimated.  
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Asset redistribution and productivity growth 
 
In this set of five simulations, we test the impact of two schemes for pro-poor 
asset redistribution and three scenarios for changes in total factor productivity. Tables 4.4 
and 4.5 summarize the assumptions and the results for this group of simulations at the 
end of the simulated time period. Apart from the last simulation, where aggregate TFP 
growth is increased, the simulations are by definition primarily redistributional 
(redistributing assets between households and productivity growth between sectors) and 
there is no strong a priori reason to expect aggregate GDP growth to change.  
 
Table 4.4. Assumptions for asset redistribution and productivity simulations. 
 





  Redistribution of agricultural land to rural poor  Yes         
Skill shift favoring low-skill households    Yes       
TFP growth shift favoring agriculture (+2% per year)      Yes     
TFP growth shift favoring manufacturing (+2% per year)        Yes   
Economywide TFP growth increase (+1% per year)          Yes 
Flexible government savings and fixed direct tax rates  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
   
 
 
In 1979, land rent accounted for 11% of total factor incomes; the bulk of it was 
collected by three household groups: rural middle-income and rich, and urban rich.
26 
Under the first simulation (LAND), 20% of the agricultural land is in 1982 redistributed 
from the rural and urban rich to the rural poor. The land losses of each of the two rich 
household groups are proportional to their initial shares in the total land area. It is 
assumed that the reform is implemented without any disruption in agricultural production 




                                                 
26Tables A.2 and A.3 show the distribution of land and other income in 1979 and their importance in the 
budgets of the different household types. 
27This assumption is reasonable given that the land reform that Egypt implemented in the 1950s and 1960s 
does not seem to have depressed agricultural productivity. One factor that may explain this outcome is that, 
in developing countries, small farms seem to be more productive than large farms (Richards, 1982, pp. 177-
178). On the other hand, drastic changes in the institutional structure may give rise to production losses, in 
particular during a transitional period. 
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Table 4.5. Results for asset redistribution and productivity simulations. 
  BASE  LAND  SKILL  TFP-AG  TFP- 
MAN 
TFP 
    divergence from BASE 
Real household consumption (%gpy)* 
    Average  2.7      0.2  -0.1  1.1 
    Rural  2.9    0.2  0.1  -0.1  1.3 
         Poor  0.8  1.4  0.8  0.3  -0.2  1.1 
         Middle  3.4    0.3  0.2  -0.1  1.3 
         Rich  3.3  -0.5  -0.1  0.1    1.3 
    Urban  2.6  -0.1  -0.2  0.2    1.0 
         Poor  0.4    0.6  0.3  -0.3  1.0 
         Middle  2.2    -0.5  0.5  0.1  0.7 
         Rich  3.7  -0.1  -0.2    -0.1  1.2 
    Poor  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.3  -0.3  1.1 
    Non-poor  3.2  -0.2  -0.1  0.2    1.1 
Theil index, 1997  (1979=100)  133.9  -15.1  -15.2  2.0  2.6  0.3 
Factor income share, 1997 (%)   
    Labor unskilled  10.5      -0.4  -0.8  0.6 
    Labor skilled  21.3      2.4  1.9  -4.0 
    Capital  58.0  0.1    0.3  -1.2  1.9 
    Land  10.2  -0.1    -2.2  0.1  1.5 
Agricultural labor share, 1997 (%)  39.6  -0.1    -4.6  2.2  2.1 
Real GDP at factor cost (%gpy)   
    Agriculture  3.2      1.5  -0.1  1.6 
    Oil  3.2      -0.6  -0.3  1.0 
    Construction  1.7  -0.1  -0.1  -0.4  -0.5  2.2 
    Manufacturing  6.0  -0.1    -0.2  0.1  2.1 
    Services  6.4  -0.1    -0.3  -0.3  1.8 
  Total  5.1  -0.1      -0.2  1.8 
Trade (%gpy)             
    Agriculture exports  2.6  -0.1  -0.1  5.3  -0.7  4.4 
    Manufacturing exports  7.6  -0.1    -0.7  0.6  2.9 
  Total export  6.0  -0.1    -0.5  -0.4  2.0 
    Agriculture imports  6.2      -3.0    0.4 
    Manufacturing imports  3.0        -0.3  1.4 
  Total imports  3.6      -0.7  -0.2  1.1 
Real exchange rate (%gpy)  1.6        -0.1  0.9 
Capital stock (%gpy)  4.0  -0.1    -0.2  -0.2  1.0 
Government savings, 1997 (% GDP)  2.9  -0.2  -0.1  -1.0  -1.8  4.5 
Direct taxes, 1997 (% GDP)  5.6  -0.1  -0.1      -0.1 
  Note: *%gpy = % growth per year. 
 
As expected, land redistribution strongly benefits the rural poor who, compared to 
the base, register an increase in their rate of consumption growth by 1.4%. Consumption 
growth declines by 0.5% and 0.1% for the rural and urban rich, respectively, primarily 
because of lower land incomes. Inequality declines drastically. The fact that the rates for 
direct taxes and savings are lower for the households that benefit from the policy shift 
leads to slightly lower growth rates for direct tax revenue and household savings, as well  
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as government savings, investment values and the capital stock. Aggregate GDP growth 
declines marginally. Other changes are minor.  
According to 1979 data, the average income of a skilled worker (as defined in this 
study) was approximately three times that of an unskilled worker. In the second 
simulation (SKILL), part of the increase in the skilled labor force (and its incomes) is 
gradually redistributed in favor of relatively unskilled household groups.
28 More 
specifically, the household affiliation of skilled workers is gradually shifted so that, by 
1997, compared to the situation in the same year under the base scenario, 20% of the 
skilled labor force has switched from relatively skilled households (urban middle-income, 
urban rich, and rural rich) to relatively unskilled households (urban poor, rural poor, and 
rural middle-income); the households that are classified as skilled have a corresponding 
increase in their stocks of unskilled labor.
29 There is no change in the total stocks of 
skilled and unskilled labor. It is assumed that the redistributed labor force earns the 
average wage. Using Chenery’s terminology, the simulated redistribution of skilled labor 
assets is an example of  “redistribution with growth”: the fruits from growth, financing 
the educational system, are allocated in a manner that permits less fortunate household 
groups to increase their shares in the stock of skilled labor. Politically, it is typically less 
difficult than land reform.
30 
The impact of this scheme on household consumption is substantial but smaller 
than for the previous simulation. The three household groups that get a more skilled labor 
force gain; the others lose. In relative terms, the rural poor gain the most (their 
consumption growth increases by 0.8%) as they have the lowest per-capita incomes. The 
relative loss is largest for the urban middle-income group since it initially depended the 
most on skilled labor income and has a lower per-capita income than both the rural and 
the urban rich. Apart from a substantial decline in inequality, the broader repercussions of 
this change are negligible. 
                                                 
28In the base simulation, the shares of each household group in skilled and unskilled labor incomes did not 
change between 1979 and 1997. 
29 The increase in skilled labor is distributed across the unskilled households is proportion to their 
population shares. The decrease in skilled labor is distributed across the skilled households in proportion to 
their shares in skilled labor incomes. (If the decreases in skilled labor had been allocated on the basis of 
population shares, the rural rich would have lost almost all of their skilled labor income. ) 
30 The present analysis is concerned with analyzing the economic effects of alternative policies, not 
assessments of their past or current political feasibility.  
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Figures 4.4-4.6, which depict the evolution of per-capita household consumption, 
confirm the redistributional nature of these two simulations. The gains for the poor are 
substantial in the beginning whereas the relative loss for the non-poor is smaller. After 
these initial adjustments, both poor and non-poor consumption grow at rates that are 
similar to those of the base scenario. 
The next two simulations explore the impact of a targeted 2% increase in TFP 
growth in agriculture and manufacturing, respectively; aggregate TFP growth is kept 
constant by means of a uniform decline in TFP growth in the non-targeted sectors.
31 The 
purpose is to investigate the effect of redirecting technical progress along different 
sectoral patterns, for example via changes in government support to R&D or spending on 
infrastructure.  
Compared to the base simulations, the shift in TFP growth toward agriculture 
(TFP-AG) raises growth in agriculture (and food processing, which is part of 
manufacturing). By the year 1997, the share of the labor force in agriculture has shrunk 
by close to 5%, an indication of that the demand elasticities facing agriculture are too low 
to permit enough sales to absorb the labor force after it has become more productive. 
There is no change in aggregate GDP at factor cost. A relative increase in non-
agricultural prices (including construction) leads to a decline in investment growth (in 
spite of an increase in nominal savings and investment values). 
This pro-agricultural scenario has a minor positive impact on aggregate welfare 
and on the welfare of all households groups except the urban rich. The impact on 
disaggregated household welfare is the net result of changes in factor incomes and 
consumer prices. In relative terms, prices decrease, not only for agricultural products but 
also for food products while they increase for other commodities, shifting terms of trade 
against agriculture. Given their consumption patterns, this pattern of price change is 
favorable for the poor and particularly unfavorable for the urban rich. This relative price 
change is partly counteracted by a shift in factor incomes from factors in intensive use in 
agriculture (unskilled labor and land). This shift in factor incomes (from agriculture to  
                                                 
31In each period, aggregate TFP is here defined as a weighted average of activity TFP levels, with the 
activity weights defined using 1979 activity shares in total value-added. Also after these changes, sectoral 
and aggregate rates of TFP growth remain within the range of the historical record for developing countries 
(cf. World Bank, 1993, p. 56).  
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Figure 4.4: Asset redistribution simulations: Average 















Figure 4.5. Asset redistribution simulations: Poor household 

















Figure 4.6: Asset redistribution simulations: Non-poor 
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other sectors) exemplifies the fact that, if the demands faced by a sector that enjoys a 
productivity increase (decrease) are relatively inelastic, productivity gains tend to reduce 
(increase) the incomes of the owners of factors used intensely in this sector (Binswanger, 
1980, pp. 201-203). Inequality increases marginally since the urban poor and middle-
income groups gain more than their poorer rural counterparts.  
In the next simulation, TFP growth shifts instead toward manufacturing (food 
processing, textiles and other industry; TFP-MAN). This leads to a decline in the shares 
in total factor incomes for unskilled labor (a factor that is used intensively in 
manufacturing). The relative prices of manufactured commodities decline. Output 
increases for two of the three manufacturing sectors.  The impact on most indicators of 
aggregate performance is negative. There are slight declines in real GDP, aggregate 
household welfare, the savings and investment value, and in real investment growth. 
Inequality increases moderately as the poor do less well than the non-poor, a reflection of 
the redistribution of factor incomes (away from unskilled labor) and relative price 
changes (lower prices for non-agricultural commodities).  
The differences between the effects of pro-agricultural and pro-manufacturing 
scenarios may be due to structural factors (in particular differences between the 
agriculture and manufacturing in terms of their links with sectors, factors, households, 
and foreign trade) and sectoral elasticity values (for factor substitution, output 
transformation, export demand, and composite supply aggregation). Whereas the 
structural data are reasonably certain, the elasticities are more uncertain. In a set of 
separate experiments, the two scenarios with pro-agricultural and pro-manufacturing bias 
(TFP-AG and TFP-MAN) were simulated in a setting where “agricultural” trade and 
production assumptions were used for all manufacturing sectors.
32 The differences 
between pro-agricultural and pro-manufacturing scenarios diminished. Nevertheless, 
compared to the case with pro-manufacturing bias, pro-agricultural bias led to higher 
consumption growth on the aggregate level and for rural and urban poor and middle-
income households.  
                                                 
32The elasticities of the agricultural sector (for factor substitution, output transformation, composite supply 
aggregation, and export demand) were applied to all manufacturing sectors. For export demand, this meant 
that the foreign-currency export prices for the manufacturing sectors were fixed (infinitely elastic export 
demand).   
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As opposed to the first two experiments, which combine a positive productivity 
change for a targeted sector with a balancing negative productivity change for all non-
targeted sectors, the last simulation offers a “free lunch” in the form of an increase in 
TFP growth by 1% for all sectors. The sources and possible resource costs of such an 
overall improvement are not specified. International experience suggests that this higher 
rate of TFP growth is attainable (cf. World Bank, 1997, p. 56). Production growth 
increases by close to 2% since higher incomes and savings generate a higher rate of 
growth in the capital stock. The distribution of factor incomes shifts in favor of capital 
and, to a lesser extent, land. Labor flows into agriculture in response to relative changes 
in factor prices. On the household level, this translates into a broadly shared gain in 
consumption growth by around 1%.  
Figures 4.7-4.9 compare the evolution of household per-capita consumption for 
the productivity simulations. They indicate that consumption growth is smooth for all 
simulations in this set. They confirm the findings of the preceding analysis regarding the 
impact of accelerating TFP growth or biasing it in favor of agriculture or manufacturing. 
In sum, the over-all results for the set of asset and productivity simulations 
suggest that redistributional policies can be pursued with little impact on aggregate 
growth. Compared to policy bias in favor of manufacturing, the effects from a 
productivity shift toward agriculture are more positive for the poor. More rapid 
productivity growth throughout the economy has a positive and evenly distributed 




The simulations in this set are focused on testing the impact of combining the 
individual changes that were included in the preceding simulations. The discussion of the 
results addresses whether there are significant synergies between the different policies.  
Tables 4.6-4.7, and Figures 4.10-4.12 summarize the results for the final 
simulation set. The first simulation, COMBO-1, combines pro-poor asset redistribution 
and a shift in productivity growth to agriculture (i.e., the simulations LAND, SKILL and 
TFP-AG). The aggregate welfare change is positive but small. The poor households gain 
significantly more as a group and inequality falls strongly. The gain in average 
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consumption is due to the shift in productivity to agriculture whereas pro-poor asset 
redistribution shifts these gains in favor of the poor. Lower household and government 
savings reduce the capital stock growth rate.  
 









          Implicit oil subsidies eliminated        Yes 
Egalitarian distribution of agricultural land to rural population  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Skill shift in favor of rural and urban poor and rural middle-
income households 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
TFP growth shift favoring agriculture (+2% per year)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Increase in agricultural export price (+1% per year)      Yes  Yes 
Reduced transactions costs in foreign trade (-50%)    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Flexible government savings and fixed direct tax rates  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
 
The next two simulations test the cumulative impact of adding, first, reduced trade 
transactions costs (COMBO-2) and, secondly, a 1% increase in the annual growth rate for 
agricultural export prices (COMBO-3), a reflection of improved penetration of 
agricultural export markets. 
In COMBO-2, the reduction in trade transactions costs boosts trade (both exports 
and imports) in general and agricultural trade in particular. Compared to COMBO-1, 
production and employment in agriculture grow more rapidly. The factor income shares 
increase for both labor types. Growth in per-capita consumption increases by 0.6% on 
average and by 0.7% for the poor. Inequality falls further. More rapid income growth 
supports and is supported by more rapid growth in real investment and in the capital 
stock.  
The addition of higher agricultural export prices in COMBO-3 (not reported as an 
individual simulation in the earlier analysis) noticeably strengthens the above-mentioned 
trends toward stronger welfare growth, especially for poor households. The capital stock 
grows slightly more rapidly while GDP growth remains unchanged. Agricultural 
production, employment, and exports expand. Inequality decreases as the gains for the 
poor in both regions are above average.  
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    divergence from BASE 
Real household consumption (%gpy)*           
    Average  2.7  0.1  0.7  0.8  1.3 
    Rural  2.9  0.4  1.0  1.1  1.6 
         Poor  0.8  2.2  2.8  3.2  3.9 
         Middle  3.4  0.5  1.0  1.0  1.5 
         Rich  3.3  -0.5  0.1  0.2  0.7 
    Urban  2.6  -0.1  0.4  0.5  0.9 
         Poor  0.4  0.9  1.5  1.8  2.4 
         Middle  2.2  -0.2  0.3  0.3  0.7 
         Rich  3.7  -0.3  0.1  0.2  0.6 
    Poor  0.6  1.5  2.2  2.5  3.2 
    Non-poor  3.2  -0.1  0.3  0.4  0.9 
Theil index, 1997 (1979=100)  133.9  -27.2  -30.3  -34.7  -39.3 
Factor income share, 1997 (%)           
    Labor unskilled  10.5  -0.5  0.1  0.7  1.3 
    Labor skilled  21.3  2.3  1.7  1.5  1.1 
    Capital  58.0  0.4  -0.3  -1.8  -3.2 
    Land  10.2  -2.2  -1.5  -0.4  0.8 
Agricultural labor share 1997 (%)  39.6  -4.7  -4.2  -2.6  -1.0 
Real GDP at factor cost (%gpy)           
    Agriculture  3.2  1.4  1.7  1.9  2.5 
    Oil  3.2  -0.6  -0.6  -0.6  -0.6 
    Construction  1.7  -0.6    0.1  0.8 
    Manufacturing  6.0  -0.2  0.4  0.4  1.2 
    Services  6.4  -0.5  -0.3  -0.3  0.5 
  Total  5.1  -0.1  0.2  0.2  0.9 
Trade (%gpy)           
    Agriculture exports  2.6  5.1  8.2  10.0  11.0 
    Manufacturing exports  7.6  -0.8  0.8  0.4  1.6 
  Total export  6.0  -0.6  0.4  0.5  1.2 
    Agriculture imports  6.2  -3.0  -0.9  0.0  0.5 
    Manufacturing imports  3.0  -0.1  0.6  0.9  1.3 
  Total imports  3.6  -0.7  0.2  0.6  1.1 
Real exchange rate (%gpy)  1.6  -0.1  0.3  0.0  0.3 
Capital stock (%gpy)  4.0  -0.4  0.2  0.3  1.6 
Government savings, 1997 (% GDP)  2.9  -1.3  -0.8  -0.9  -0.3 
Direct taxes, 1997 (% GDP)  5.6  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  -0.3 
            Note: *%gpy = % growth per year. 
 
A comparison among the results for the three combined simulations indicates that 
lower trade transactions coefficients and higher agricultural export prices are the main 
factors behind the increase in average per-capita consumption; they also contributed 
significantly to the decline in inequality. However, as noted earlier, pro-poor asset 
policies contributed strongly to the consumption growth of the poor (especially in rural 
areas) and are the main source behind the decline in inequality (see the simulations 
LAND and SKILL).   
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The final simulation, COMBO-4,  adds elimination of implicit oil subsidies in 
1982 to COMBO-3. This addition has a significant positive impact on households (both 
on the aggregate level and for all household groups except the urban rich). The poor gain 
more than the non-poor and inequality declines further. These changes are stronger than 
when implicit oil subsidies were eliminated in isolation from other policies.  
With regard to COMBO-4, Figures 4.10-4.12 show that, in spite of the oil subsidy 
cut, household consumption growth is always positive. Hence, when appearing in a 
policy package, this policy, which in the long run has a positive impact on household 
welfare, can be introduced without imposing a negative shock on poor households. Also 
for the other simulations, the figures indicate that real consumption grows smoothly for 
the different households. 
The pro-agricultural productivity shift was incorporated into the combined 
scenario given its positive welfare effects, in particular for the poor. As noted earlier, 
some of the trade and production elasticities are uncertain. As part of the sensitivity tests, 
this set of simulations was implemented with the same assumptions as for the textile 
sector applied to agriculture (most importantly, reducing the elasticity of export demand 
from infinity to four). Compared to the results presented in Table 4.7, the aggregate 
welfare change was very similar and it remained pro-poor and pro-rural. However, 
consumption growth for the poor households was cut by around one third and the results 
were less pro-rural, primarily because of a decline in agricultural terms of trade. This 
points to the importance of access to export markets in influencing the distributional 
impact of accelerated agricultural productivity growth.  
The effect of multiple changes undertaken simultaneously may be different from 
the sum of the effects of each change undertaken in isolation; in terms of specific 
indicators, the changes may reinforce each other (positive synergy) or weaken each other 
(negative synergy).
33  
Table 4.8 extracts information on synergy effects for household welfare and 
inequality indicators, drawing on results from individual and combined simulations. The 
first part of the table restates selected data from Table 4.7; the second computes the 
                                                 
33 For example, the combined welfare effect of a productivity improvement in a sector and improved access 
to markets for the same sector may be larger than the sum of the welfare effects of each of these changes in 
isolation.  
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synergy effects for each combined simulation as the difference between, on the one hand 
the divergence from the base for the combined simulation and, on the other hand, the sum 
of the divergences from the base for the individual simulations that make up the 
combined simulation. For COMBO-1, the consumption gains for the poor and the decline 
in the Theil coefficient are smaller than for the sum of the individual simulations. The 
simultaneous pursuit of land and human capital distribution dampens the reduction in 
inequality and the gains for the poor with little impact on the average household. In terms 
of reducing inequality and raising consumption growth, both for the poor and on average, 
positive synergies stem from the introduction of reduced trade transactions costs, higher 
agricultural exports prices and the elimination of oil subsidies (the changes introduced in 
the simulations COMBO-2, COMBO-3, and COMBO-4). 
 
 
Table 4.8. Synergy effects for combined simulations. 
  SIMULATION 








1. Divergence from BASE for combined simulation   
a. Average household consumption (%gpy)  0.1  0.7  0.8  1.3 
b. Poor household consumption (%gpy)  1.5  2.2  2.5  3.2 
c. Theil index (1979=100)  -27.2  -30.3  -34.7  -39.3 
         
2. Synergy: (1) minus sum of divergences for simulations 
with the individual changes of the combined simulation         
a. Average household consumption (%gpy)  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2 
b. Poor household consumption (%gpy)  -0.2  -0.1  0.1  0.3 
c. Theil index (1979=100)  1.1  -1  -3.5  -5.1 




  In this chapter, a CGE model has been used to simulate, ex post, Egypt’s 
economic performance during the period 1979-1997 under alternative scenarios for price 
policies, trade transactions costs, asset distribution, and productivity growth. While this 
chapter analyzed some aspects of economic policy in Egypt during a period that belongs 
to the past, its lessons are relevant also to the future, both in Egypt and countries with a 
similar economic structure.  
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The guiding question for this chapter is whether Egypt’s government, by 
following different policies, could have significantly improved the status of its poor. The 
analysis, which is subject to the limitations of a model that simplifies a complex reality, 
indicates that the answer is yes. Pro-poor redistribution of land and human capital assets 
could have been a particularly effective tool had Egypt prioritized more strongly to 
improve the welfare of the poor and reduce inequalities. Such policies could have been 
implemented without any noticeable negative impact on growth or aggregate welfare. 
Politically, modifying the human capital distribution would probably have been easier 
since, being an example of “redistribution with growth,” it can be implemented with a 
less noticeable negative impact on those households that are disfavored by the policy. 
With regard to the broader issues that this study addresses, the results indicate 
that, in the Egyptian case, there is no contradiction between more rapid growth, largely a 
function of more rapid productivity growth, and improved welfare for the poor. The 
impact of more rapid reduction of price distortions, induced by taxes and subsidies, is 
small but positive in terms of aggregate growth. The effects of introducing biases in favor 
of specific sectors are stronger and depend on the specific context, including the nature of 
economic linkages and, with regard to the policies analyzed in this chapter, on the ease 
with which it is possible to raise productivity growth, reduce transactions costs, and get 
improved access to export markets. The present analysis confirms the finding of earlier 
analyses that, compared to pro-manufacturing policies, pro-agricultural policies have a 
more positive impact on household welfare in general and the poor in particular. There is 
a significant synergy between a pro-agricultural shift in productivity growth, improved 
market access for agricultural exports, and reduced transactions costs in foreign trade.  
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Table A.1. Structure of Egypt’s Economy in 1979 and 1997 (%). 
 
Sector 
















Structure of the Economy in 1979        (%) 
     Agriculture  20.8  22.4  19.9  7.7  16.9  5.3  19.3 
     Food processing  11.0  2.9  12.9  1.4  12.5  1.9  22.0 
     Textiles  7.4  4.3  6.4  5.9  1.8  11.6  6.3 
     Oil  11.0  15.6  3.5  54.6  2.7  71.8  17.9 
     Other industry  11.1  7.4  23.7  3.2  53.2  4.2  50.9 
     Construction  6.6  5.9  5.8         
     Transportation  5.1  7.4  2.7  16.9  1.2  47.5  10.3 
     Public administration  4.8  10.1  4.3         
     Services  22.2  24.0  20.9  10.3  11.7  6.7  12.7 
 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0     
                 Structure of the Economy in 1997        (%) 
     Agriculture  14.4  19.1  15.2  0.5  9.3  0.5  9.5 
     Food processing  11.9  3.5  11.7  1.8  3.7  1.9  4.8 
     Textiles  8.0  4.8  7.1  7.2  1.9  11.6  4.2 
     Oil  4.4  9.4  3.4  18.4  8.2  52.8  37.7 
     Other industry  14.8  12.7  23.4  10.3  65.2  8.9  43.0 
     Construction  7.9  5.4  7.6         
     Transportation  6.6  8.0  3.9  22.2  1.4  43.0  5.4 
     Public administration  4.4    4.3         
     Services  27.7  37.0  23.5  39.5  10.3  18.2  6.7 
 Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0     
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Table A.2. Structure of household incomes, 1979 (%). 
  Factor income 
  Labor  Capital  Land 







   
     
   
    Poor  10.9  57.8  0.0  7.8  8.0  15.4  100.0 
    Middle  11.3  5.3  46.1  16.5  7.1  13.7  100.0 
    Rich  10.5  0.0  34.8  34.1  7.0  13.6  100.0 
Urban households               
    Poor 
 
17.7  58.6  0.0  0.0  8.1  15.6  100.0 
    Middle 
 
50.3  4.1  23.1  0.0  7.7  14.9  100.0 
    Rich  23.8  0.0  49.8  5.5  7.1  13.8  100.0 
               







Table A.3. Allocation of factor incomes to households in 1979 (%). 
  Factor income 
  Labor  Capital  Land 
  Unskilled  Skilled     
Rural households 
   
   
    Poor 
 
39.0  3.9  0.0  5.6 
    Middle 
 
7.0  8.0  22.8  23.3 
    Rich  0.0  8.9  20.7  57.8 
Urban households         
    Poor  47.4  7.5  0.0  0.0 
    Middle  6.6  42.8  13.9  0.0 
    Rich  0.0  28.9  42.6  13.3 
         
Total  100  100  100  100 
         
Source: SAM for 1979 (see Löfgren, 2000)   
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Table A.4. Factor income shares disaggregated by sector, 1979 (%). 
           
    Labor  Capital  Land  Total 
    Unskilled  Skilled       
Agriculture  24.4    25.3  50.3  100.0 
Oil    1.4  1.1  97.5  0.0  100.0 
Construction  7.6  27.5  64.9  0.0  100.0 
Food Processing  22.1  16.2  61.7  0.0  100.0 
Textiles    29.3  17.6  53.2  0.0  100.0 
Other Industry  24.8  16.4  58.8  0.0  100.0 
Transportation  6.4  18.1  75.5  0.0  100.0 
Public Administration  8.3  91.7  0.0  0.0  100.0 
Services    2.9  30.7  66.4  0.0  100.0 
Total    11.8  22.3  54.8  11.1   
Source: SAM for 1979 (see Löfgren, 2000)       
 
 





Agriculture  3.0  2.4  0.9 
Oil  ¥  0.9  0.2 
Construction  n.a.
4  n.a.
4  0.9 
Food processing  1.5  0.9  0.9 
Textiles  1.5  0.9  0.9 
Other industry  1.5  0.9  0.9 
Transportation  1.5  0.9  0.9 
Public administration  1.5  n.a.
4  0.2 
Services  1.5  0.9  0.9 
Source:  Author assessment, drawing on Löfgren (1994b). 
Abbreviations: 
1CET    Elasticity of transformation between exports and domestic sales in CET function 
    (transforming domestic output to exports and domestic sales); 
2Armington  Elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic output in Armington function (CES 
    function aggregating imports and domestic output sold domestically to composite domestic 
    commodity) 
3CES    Elasticity of factor substitution in CES value-added function 
4n.a.    Not applicable 
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Table A.6. Model values for household expenditure elasticities and Frisch parameter 
  Rural    Urban 
  Poor  Middle  Rich    Poor  Middle  Rich 
Agriculture  0.09  0.11  0.32    0.27  0.16  0.03 
Oil  2.37  2.01  1.64    1.52  1.55  1.39 
Construction  0.62  0.62  0.95    0.80  0.66  0.36 
Food processing  2.37  2.01  1.64    1.52  1.55  1.39 
Textiles  2.37  2.01  1.64    1.52  1.55  1.39 
Other industry  2.37  2.01  1.64    1.52  1.55  1.39 
Services  2.37  2.01  1.64    1.52  1.55  1.39 
Frisch parameter  -7.27  -5.99  -4.21    -6.21  -4.95  -3.34 
Source: Dethier 1979, p. 184 (for elasticities); SAM for 1979, IMF (various years), and formula in LLuch et al. ,1977, p. 248 
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Figure A.1. Elimination of consumer subsidies under alternative 


















Figure A.3. Elimination of consumer subsidies under alternative 






























Figure A.2. Elimination of consumer subsidies under alternative 
government closures: Poor household per capita consumption (1979=100) 
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Figure A.4. Elimination of oil subsidies under alternative 

















Figure A.5. Elimination of oil subsidies under alternative 

















Figure A.6. Elimination of oil subsidies under alternative 
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